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Abstract: We consider a variation of the Monty Hall problem and we present a quantum version
of it in which the quiz show master does not know where the prize is and can accidentally reveal it.
We prove that if the quiz show master is allowed to play quantum and the player is not the game
becomes a fair game in contrast with the classical version of the game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inspired by the work of von-Neumann and Oskar
Morgesten [10] many mathematicians and economists
have used simple games to understand concepts of game
theory, well-known examples are the prisoner’s dilemma
[9] and “the battle of sexes” [7], among others. Moreover
the study of games of chance has been used for classical
information theorists since 1950s. Meyer [6] in 1999 in-
troduces a way of generalizing the classical game theory
into the quantum world, creating quantum games. In
quantum games we assume some of the parts (or all of
them) of the classic game have been quantized, we can
quantize the players’ strategies or the objects used in the
game.
Some games have already been brought into the quantum
world, in relation to prisoner’s dilemma, Eisert, Wilkens,
and Lewenstein [2] show that this game ceases to pose
a dilemma if quantum strategies are allowed. They also
construct a particular quantum strategy which always
gives reward if played against any classical strategy. An-
other well-known dilemma in classical information is the
Monty Hall problem and the revision of this problem into
the quantum world can be of interest in the study of
quantum strategies of quantum measurements.
Our paper is organized as follows, we will explain the clas-
sical Monty Hall problem and a variation of it in section
II. In section III we expound a genuine way to quantize
the variation of the problem previously explained and we
solve the problem giving the best choice for the player
in any case. Finally in section IV we discuss some other
versions of the quantum Monty Hall problem which have
been already published.
II. THE CLASSIC MONTY HALL PROBLEM
The Monty Hall problem [8] is a well-known and a
frustrating brainteaser in all of mathematics. On the
surface this problem appears to be simple, however it
can be challenging. This problem is due to a TV quiz
show where are shown three doors, two of them hiding
a goat and the other one hiding a car. The player, lets
call him Bob, makes a guess and picks one of the three
doors. Then, the quiz show master, let’s call her Alice,
who knows where the prize is hiding, opens a door in
accordance with the following rules:
I Alice must not open the door picked by Bob.
II Alice must not open the door containing the prize.
III If Alice can open more than a door (i.e., Bob made
the right choice) without violating rules I and II,
then she opens one of these doors randomly.
Given this extra information, Bob is now asked if he
wants to stay with his initial choice or otherwise change
his choice to the unopened door. It can be shown that
Bob has 13 probability of winning the car if he sticks to his
initial choice and 23 probability of winning if he switches
to the unopened door. For further information see [8].
We want to present a variation of this game when some
of the rules concerning Alice’s choice of a door have been
relaxed.
A. A variation of the classic problem
Suppose that the prize has been hidden by Clarice,
whose only function in this game is to prepare the game,
therefore the quiz show master, Alice, does not know
where the prize is hidden. In this case after Bob’s initial
choice, Alice will open one of the two remaining doors
randomly, therefore there is a chance of her opening
the door containing the car. In that way we eliminated
condition II.
Notice the main differences between the original
game and this version, Alice can open the door with
the prize and Bob has no more the two strategies
after Alice opens a door (stay, switch) and has three
strategies (pick door one, pick door two, pick door three).
As the reader can check, this is a simple problem
of probabilities, and Bob expects to win in 23 of the
times no matter what strategy he follows as long as
he is a rational player, in other words this means Bob
is not switching to the opened door if Alice reveals no
prize in it, the result is not sensible to Bob’s strategy
in this case. And if Alice reveals the prize when she
opens a door, then Bob is picking that door as his final
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choice. Thus this variation of the game does not modify
the classical probabilities even though impoverishes the
game.
III. THE QUANTUM MONTY HALL PROBLEM
A. Analysis of the game under limited information
In this section we will set forth the quantum version
of the variation of the classic Monty hall problem
described in the previous section. The main quantum
variable will be the position of the prize, which lies in
a 3-dimensional Hilbert space H. We will also quan-
tize the Alice’s choice of a box in contrast with Bob’s
first and second choice of a Box that will remain classical.
Before the game starts the system is prepared quantum
mechanically (by Clarice) so that a quantum particle is
in a superposition of the states |0〉, |1〉, |2〉; representing
the doors of the classic problem. Let {|0〉, |1〉, |2〉} be
the orthonormal basis of H. The prize will be in any
point of the upper hemisphere of the S2 as don’t take
into account the imaginary parts, in this work we will
stay real. Then, the initial state can be described as:
|ψ0〉 = sin θ0 cosϕ0|0〉+ sin θ0 sinϕ0|1〉+ cos θ0|2〉. (1)
Where ϕ0 ∈ [0, 2pi] and θ0 ∈ [0, pi2 ]. We consider
only the upper hemisphere since the states (θ0, ϕ0) and
(pi − θ0, ϕ0 + pi) are the same, with this restriction, from
a quantum point of view we remove any redundancy. We
can use different probability distributions for the param-
eters θ0 and ϕ0. We will assume that the prize is any
point of the upper hemisphere with equal probability so
the probability distribution we will use:
P (θ0, ϕ0)dθ0dϕ0 =
1
2pi
sin θ0dθ0dϕ0. (2)
The game proceeds in the following stages:
I Bob chooses a projection p = |φ〉〈φ| along one of
the axis onH, i.e., Bob is restricted to choose either
|φ〉 = |0〉, |1〉, |2〉.
II Alice’s choice of a door is q = |χ〉〈χ|, by rule I,
it must be another door so q ⊥ p. During this
step Alice could show the “location” of the prize
as we do not assume q ⊥ |ψ0〉〈ψ0|, that is due to
the fact that Alice does not know where the car is.
After Alice performs a measurement the quantum
system will have collapsed in the two-dimensional
space (1− q)H if Alice don’t hit the prize and will
collapse in qH if she hits the prize.
III After seeing Alice’s move and with all the informa-
tion but the parameters θ0 and ϕ0, Bob can pick a
direction again as in step I.
We want to study how Alice can decide whether help
Bob to win the car or make a fair game for her with her
choice of a “door”, which in this case will be a projection
on H.
Let the initial state of the prize be as equation (1)
and without loss of generality |φ0〉 = |2〉 the initial
choice of Bob. Alice must pick a direction orthogonal
to Bob’s choice so she picks any direction in the plane
{|0〉, |1〉}:
|χ〉 = sin θ1|0〉+ cos θ1|1〉. (3)
With θ1 ∈ [0, pi2 ]. Alice can control the θ1 parameter
and it is public information so Bob knows exactly Alice’s
move. We can compute now the expected value of the
probability of Alice hitting the prize:∫
S
|〈ψ0|χ〉|2P (θ0, ϕ0)dθ0dϕ0 = 1
2pi
∫
S
|〈ψ0|χ〉|2 sin θ0dθ0dϕ0
=
1
2
sin2 θ1
∫ pi
2
0
sin3 θ0dθ0 +
1
2
cos2 θ1
∫ pi
2
0
sin3 θ0dθ0
=
1
2
· 2
3
sin2 θ1 +
1
2
· 2
3
cos2 θ1 =
1
3
. (4)
So we expect that in one third of the games Alice re-
veals the prize, however this does not ensure Bob a easy
win. In this case the position of the prize will have col-
lapsed in the state |ψ′〉 = |χ〉 = sin θ1|0〉+ cos θ1|1〉, but
Bob is still restricted to pick a direction along one of the
axis, so if he picks the door |0〉 his probability of hitting
the prize is sin2 θ1, and cos
2 θ1 if he picks the door |1〉.
Therefore if Bob is a rational player his expected payoff
is:
max
θ1∈[0,pi2 ]
{sin2 θ1, cos2 θ1}. (5)
In the other two thirds of the games Alice won’t hit the
prize so after her measurement the position of the prize
will have collapsed to the space (1− q)H. Now the posi-
tion of the prize can be given by:
|ψ′〉 = (1− |χ〉〈χ|)|χ〉
= g(θ0, ϕ0)
(
cos θ1|0〉+ sin θ1|1〉
)
+ cos θ0|2〉. (6)
Where g(θ0, ϕ0) = sin θ0 cos(ϕ0 +θ1). As the reader may
see |ψ′〉 is not normalized so we have to normalize it. Let
N = cos2 θ0 + g
2(θ0, ϕ0) be the normalizing constant,
then the state of the prize is:
|ψ1〉 = 1√
N
[
g(θ0, ϕ0)
(
cos θ1|0〉+ sin θ1|1〉
)
+ cos θ0|2〉
]
.
(7)
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At this moment, Bob knows that the state of the prize
is the one described in equation (7). Now he is asked to
decide whether stick to his initial choice |φ0〉 or switch to
another door. He can compute the quantum probabilities
P i(θ0, ϕ0; θ1) = |〈ψ1|i〉|2 of hitting the prize when the
state (θ0, ϕ0) is known if Bob picks the door |i〉. Then if
he picks the |0〉:
P 0(θ0, ϕ0; θ1) =
cos2 θ1
1 + cot2 θ0 sec2(ϕ0 + θ1)
. (8)
If he picks |1〉:
P 1(θ0, ϕ0; θ1) =
sin2 θ1
1 + cot2 θ0 sec2(ϕ0 + θ1)
. (9)
And if he picks |2〉:
P 2(θ0, ϕ0; θ1) =
1
1 + tan2 θ0 cos2(ϕ0 + θ1)
. (10)
Now we can compute Bob’s expected value of the prob-
ability of winning when he picks any of the doors by in-
tegrating these probabilities on the upper hemisphere of
S2 because (θ0, ϕ0) are unknown to Bob. Remember that
the distribution of the probability is given by equation
(2). Then:
〈$0〉 =
∫
S
P 0(θ0, ϕ0; θ1)P (θ0, ϕ0)dθ0dϕ0
=
cos2 θ1
2pi
∫ pi
2
0
sin θ0
2pi(1−
√
cot2 θ0
1 + cot2 θ0
) dθ0
= cos2 θ1
∫ pi
2
0
(
sin θ0 − sin θ0 cos θ0
)
dθ0 =
1
2
cos2 θ1.
(11)
In the same way we can find:
〈$1〉 =
∫
S
P 1(θ0, ϕ0; θ1)P (θ0, ϕ0)dθ0dϕ0 =
1
2
sin2 θ1.
(12)
And finally:
〈$2〉 =
∫
S
P 2(θ0, ϕ0; θ1)P (θ0, ϕ0)dθ0dϕ0
=
1
2pi
∫
S
sin θ0
dθ0dϕ0
1 + tan2 θ0 cos2(ϕ0 + θ1)
=
∫ pi
2
0
sin θ0√
1 + tan2 θ0
dθ0 =
1
2
. (13)
Whatever Alice’s choice of θ1, Bob expects more or
equal if he picks |2〉 because 12 ≥ 12 sin θ1, 12 cos θ1, so
at least, if Bob is a rational player, his expected payoff
equals 12 by picking |φ1〉 = |2〉 as his final choice in this
case. Now we can compute the total expected payoff for
Bob in this quantum version of the game, which will take
into account the probabilities of Bob winning the game
when Alice hits the prize when she picks a door and when
she doesn’t hit the prize.
〈$〉 = 1
3
max
θ1∈[0,pi2 ]
{
sin2 θ1, cos
2 θ1
}
+
2
3
· 1
2
=
1
3
(
1 + max
θ1∈[0,pi2 ]
{
sin2 θ1, cos
2 θ1
})
. (14)
It is fulfilled that 12 ≤ 〈$〉 ≤ 23 . The lower bound is
reached when Alice plays θ1 =
pi
4 , which corresponds with
a move |χ〉 = 1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|0〉. Playing like this, Alice plays
the “the most quantum possible”, taking advantage of
the fact that Bob is restricted to playing classical, and
makes a fair game for her. On the other hand the upper
bound is reached when Alice plays θ1 = 0 or θ1 =
pi
2 ,
which corresponds with the moves |χ〉 = |0〉 or |χ〉 = |1〉.
These plays do not take profit of the possible quantum
moves which Alice can make as she remains classical, so
Bob can reach his expected payoff of 〈$〉 = 23 like in the
classical game.
B. The influence of complete information
In this section we will analyze how often does Clarice
agree with Bob’s decision. We will do this by plotting the
probabilities P i(θ0, ϕ0; θ1) (which Clarice knows because
she knows the state (θ0, ϕ0)) as a functions of θ0 and ϕ0
which are unknown to Bob. Let u = ϕ02pi and ω = cos θ0.
As θ0 ∈ [0, pi2 ] and ϕ0 ∈ [0, 2pi] then (u, ω2) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1].
Therefore we can rewrite equations (8) to (10) as:
P 0(u, ω; θ1) =
1
N
cos2 θ1(1− ω2) cos2(2piu+ θ1). (15)
P 1(u, ω; θ1) =
1
N
sin2 θ1(1− ω2) cos2(2piu+ θ1). (16)
P 2(u, ω; θ1) =
1
N
ω2. (17)
It is obvious that max{P 0(u, ω; θ1), P 1(u, ω; θ1)} =
maxθ1∈[0,pi2 ]{sin2 θ1, cos2 θ1}, so we want to study when
the probability of “door” 2 is higher or lower than
“doors” 0 and 1. i.e., we want to study when it is prefer-
able for Bob to change his initial choice or to stick to his
initial choice. Let β = max{sin2 θ1, cos2 θ1}, combining
equations (15),(16) and (17), we reach the following con-
clusion: as Bob, picking as final decision |2〉 has higher
probability than picking |0〉 or |1〉 when:
ω2 >
β2 cos2(2piu+ θ1)
1 + β2 cos2(2piu+ θ1)
, (18)
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and it is worthier to pick |0〉 or |1〉 when:
ω2 <
β2 cos2(2piu+ θ1)
1 + β2 cos2(2piu+ θ1)
. (19)
In this last case Bob would have to pick |0〉 or |1〉
depending on the parameter θ1 chosen by Alice which
he already knows.
We can plot these probabilities to further compre-
hension of Bob’s better choice and what does Clarice
think about Bob’s decision. First of all we present a
graph showing the behavior of inequation (19) when
θ1 = 0 and θ1 =
pi
4 :
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
u
ω
2
FIG. 1: Inquation (19) for θ1 = 0 (green) and θ1 =
pi
4
(red).
The filled area shows us all the possible pairs (θ0, ϕ0)
where is would be preferable to choose |0〉 or |1〉 as fi-
nal decision, so it shows when Clarice and Bob would
disagree (remember that Bob best strategy is to stick to
his initial choice |2〉 as we mentioned in the previous sec-
tion). The following graphs put on display how the curve
changes when the parameter θ1 vary.
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FIG. 2: Curves of probability for 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ pi4 .
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FIG. 3: Curves of probability for pi
4
≤ θ1 ≤ pi2 .
The conclusion is that picking |0〉 or |1〉 than |2〉, i.e., it
would be preferable switching than sticking to your initial
choice has maximum worth when Alice plays θ1 = 0 or
θ1 =
pi
2 , and it has minimum worth when Alice plays
θ1 =
pi
4 .
IV. OTHER VERSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
In this section we want to summarize three other ver-
sions of the problem that have been published. This three
other versions are based in the original Monty Hall prob-
lem instead of a variation of the problem as we do. Nev-
ertheless, these examples show that the quantization of
a classical game is non-unique.
• The quantization proposed in [4] is completely dif-
ferent from our approach. The parts that have been
quantized from the original problem are not mea-
surements as we do, Flitney and Abbott suggest
that the moves Alice and Bob can do are oper-
ations on a tripartite system. Alice’s and Bob’s
choices are represented by qutrits and they start
in some initial state ψ ∈ HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HO. These
Hilbert spaces represent the door where Alice hides
the prize, the door that Bob chooses and the door
that has been opened by Alice respectively. If the
initial state is |ψi〉, the final state of the system is:
|ψf 〉 =
(
Sˆ cos γ + Nˆ sin γ
)
Oˆ
(
1⊗ Bˆ ⊗ Aˆ
)
|ψi〉. (20)
Where Aˆ is Alice’s choice of operator, Bˆ is Bob’s
choice of operator, Oˆ the opening box operator,
Sˆ and Nˆ are Bob’s switching and not switching
operators. Bob also controls the parameter γ to
play a mixed strategy of switching or not switching.
They reach the following result: if Alice has access
to quantum strategies and Bob doesn’t, she can
make the game fair with a expected payoff of 12
for each player. Otherwise, if Bob has access to
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quantum strategies and Alice does not, then he can
win the game all the times.
• A completely different different way to implement
quantum strategies is proposed in [5]. In this
version, Alice puts the quantum particle in a
box, maybe in a superposition state like |ψ〉p =
1√
3
(|0〉+ |1〉+ |2〉). After Bob picks one box, for
instance |0〉, and Alice reveals no particle in |2〉,
the state of the particle may be described by the
density matrix:
ρp =
1
3
|0〉〈0|+ 2
3
|1〉〈1|. (21)
Now Alice is allowed to perform a von-Neumann
measurement on the particle, shuﬄing it around
and the game is reduced to a coin tossing game.
• The most closely related published version to ours
is [1]. Although the idea for this paper came up
in a bar during a workshop as the authors confess,
they came up with some interesting ideas to face
the quantum Monty Hall problem. The most im-
portant one and the one we have exploited in this
work is to see the position of the prize and all the
strategies of the players as directions in the space.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a variation of the classical Monty
Hall problem where the quiz show master does not know
where the prize is. In contrast with the original version
where the player expected a payoff of 13 if sticking to the
initial choice and 23 if switching, in our version, if the
player is rational, he expects a payoff of 23 , see section
II A.
In the quantum version of our problem the prize is
quantum particle which is in a random superposition (1)
on the upper hemisphere of the S2. Alice is allowed to
perform quantum measurements and Bob is restricted
to classical moves. We prove that the expected payoff
for Bob is 12 ≤ 〈$〉 ≤ 23 . Playing classical, Bob can never
overcome his expected payoff of the classical game. In
fact, Alice decides the value of Bob’s payoff when she
makes her move (3). That’s due to the fact that Alice
is allowed to play quantum and Bob isn’t, and this is a
clear advantage for Alice who can make the game fair
for both players by playing quantum.
This game offers more research than we have done,
it may be interesting to study how the players’ payoff is
affected when the probability distribution of the prize
does not verify equation (2), or how it is affected when
Bob has to pay or cede part of the prize if he wants to
change his initial choice after Alice’s move.
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